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Abstract 
In this paper, I investigate the phenomenon of long waves of capitalist development 
from two perspectives. First, I look for evidence of long waves of economic growth 
taking the dates for turning points of long waves from the historical literature (Mandel, 
1995). Using historical data for 20 capitalist countries from the Maddison-Project, I find 
that the growth rate of real per capita GDP (and real GDP) is significantly higher in the 
upswing than in the downswing phase of long waves. I interpret this as evidence of long 
waves of economic activity. Second, I revisit the method used by Gordon, Weisskopf and 
Bowles (1983) to identify long waves, using historical data on the U.S. economy from 
Duménil and Lévy (2013). I use this definition of long waves to test their hypothesis that 
business cycle downturns are “reproductive” during the upswing phase and “non-
reproductive” during the downswing phase of long waves. I find evidence in support of 
the hypothesis.  
JEL Codes: B14; B24; B51. 
Keywords: capitalism; long waves; expected profitability.  
1. Introduction. 
In the heterodox tradition of political economy, it is common to analyze the dynamics of 
capitalist economies at two very different time scales. The first is the “long run” that spans 
several decades, or even centuries, during which capitalism’s underlying long run tendencies 
related to the growth of the forces of production, inter-capitalist competition and the capital-
labour conflict come to the fore. The second is the “short run” that spans a few years – typically 
                                                          
± Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Email: dbasu@econs.umass.edu. I would like to 
thank Sam Bowles, Debarshi Das, Duncan Foley, Tom Weisskopf and participants at the Political Economy 
Workshop in the Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, for comments on an earlier 
version of the paper. The usual disclaimers apply. 
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the length of a business cycle – during which the operation of economic, social and political 
forces give rise to marked and irregular fluctuations in the pace of economic activity. An 
interesting hypothesis is that capitalist economies also display long waves of economic activity 
that span several business cycles.  
These long waves, spanning several business cycles, are composed of alternating 
periods of growth (long upswings) and relative stagnation or decline (long downswings). During 
the long upswing phase, the average pace of economic activity increases even as the economy 
fluctuates at business cycle frequencies. In an analogous but opposite movement, the average 
pace of economic activity declines over the long downswing phase, even as the economy moves 
through shorter fluctuations of the typical business cycles.   
The hypothesis that capitalist development moves through long waves, i.e., in 
alternating periods of growth and stagnation, attracted attention of the economics profession 
in the 1930s. In a series of papers and books that were published in Russian in the decade of 
the 1920s, economist and statistician, Nikolai D. Kondratieff proposed the theory of and 
provided some evidence for long waves. Some of Kondratieff’s work was translated into English 
in the early 1930s (Kondratieff and Stolper, 1935). But it really became part of the mainstream 
discourse in economics when Kondratieff’s work on long waves was endorsed strongly by 
Joseph A. Shumpeter in his magisterial work on business cycles (Schumpeter, 1939; Lange, 
1941).  
It is an interesting fact of the history of economic thought that important work on long 
waves predates Kondratieff’s research on this topic. The phenomenon of long waves of 
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capitalist economic development was first proposed and studied by Marxist scholars at the end 
of the 19th century. The German Marxist Alexander L. Parvus and the Dutch Marxist Jacob van 
Gelderen did pioneering work on long waves. Russian Marxists like Trotsky, Ospirin and others 
participated in developing this literature further (for details, see chapter 4 in Mandel, 1978).  
While the mainstream and Marxist literature on long waves had some commonalities, 
they differed in two key respects. First, for the Marxist tradition, fluctuation in the rate of profit 
is the central mechanism for the generation of long waves. For mainstream theorists like 
Kondratieff and Schumpeter, on the other hand, factors like the availability of credit, the 
accumulation of money capital, investment in long-lived capital assets and major technological 
innovations interact to create long waves. There is no role for profitability in their theories. 
Second, for mainstream theorists, there is a certain automaticity to the long waves; a long wave 
downturn almost automatically generates the next long wave upturn through the operation of 
purely economic factors. The Marxist tradition differs sharply from this understanding. For 
Marxist theorists, there is no automatic mechanism to ensure that a long wave downturn will 
become the next long wave upturn. The role of extra-economic factors is important in 
generating a long wave upturn.   
Within the Marxist tradition itself, one can discern at least two different, though 
related, approaches. The first approach, which I will call the traditional Marxist approach, 
identifies turning points of long waves by relying on qualitative evidence from the historical 
literature, and uses changes in the average pace of economic activity, measured by changes in 
the growth rate of output (or exports), as evidence of long waves of capitalist development. 
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Long waves, in this approach, are generated by fluctuations in the pace of capital accumulation, 
the latter determined, in turn, by fluctuations in the rate of profit. For this approach, the 
transition from a long wave downturn to a new long upturn is caused by extra-economic factors 
like wars, revolutions, spatial expansion of capitalism, and imperialism.   
The second Marxist approach is associated with the social structure of accumulation 
(SSA) approach in Marxist political economy that was developed in the United States in the late 
1970s (see, e.g., Gordon, 1980; Gordon, Edwards and Reich, 1982; Gordon, Weisskopf and 
Bowles, 1983). In this approach, a matrix of institutions that impinge on the capital 
accumulation process – institutions that govern the capital-labour relation, the process of inter-
capitalist competition, the provision of money and credit, and other such institutions – is 
identified as a SSA, and long waves of capitalist development are associated with the succession 
of SSAs. Once in place, an SSA provides stability to profitability expectations, which, in turn, 
spurs capital accumulation and economic growth. This upswing phase gradually erodes the 
conditions that anchor profitability expectations, and gives place to a long downswing phase. A 
construction of a new SSA, that is the result of political, economic and social factors, is required 
to initiate the next long wave. 
Within this general SSA framework of analysis, Gordon, Weisskopf and Bowles (1983) 
offer an interesting and theoretically grounded way of identifying upswing and downswing 
phases of long waves. To differentiate the upswing and downswing phases of long waves, they 
differentiate between reproductive and non-reproductive business cycle downturns. They 
argue that business cycle downturns that are associated with increases in the expected profit 
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rate should be understood as “reproductive” cycles because these cyclical downturns 
endogenously restore profitability expectations; in an analogous manner, cyclical downturns 
that do not display this property could be classified as “non-reproductive” cycles. This leads 
them to suggest that the upswing phase of a long wave is composed of (possibly a sequence of) 
reproductive business cycles, and the downswing phase is composed of (again, possibly a 
sequence of) non-reproductive business cycles.  
Gordon, Weisskopf and Bowles (1983) also advance a hypothesis about the mechanism 
that drive the reproductive and non-reproductive cycles: changes in the reserve army of labour 
is restorative of profitability expectations in one case (reproductive cycle), but stops working in 
the other (non-reproductive cycle). Thus, increases in the unemployment rate, understood as a 
proxy for changes in the size of the reserve army of labour, should be positively associated with 
changes in expected profitability during reproductive cycles; no such association should be seen 
for non-reproductive cycles.  
This paper contributes the literature on long waves in two ways. First, I use data on per 
capita real GDP for 20 capitalist countries to investigate if there is any evidence for the 
existence of long waves of economic growth. I find strong evidence for the existence of long 
waves of economic activity in these 20 capitalist countries since 1848. I also find that the long 
wave associated with the so-called Golden Age of capitalism, the two and a half decade period 
after the end of the Second World War, is an anomaly in the history of capitalism: for the 
Golden Age, there is no significant difference in the pace of economic activity between the 
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upswing and downswing phases. But the difference in the pace of economic activity re-emerges 
in the neoliberal period since the early 1980s. 
 Second, I use historical data on the US economy from Duménil and Lévy (2013) to 
revisit the analysis advanced in Gordon, Weisskopf and Bowles (1983). In particular, I use their 
method to identify long waves and find that the US economy has witnessed 7 long waves since 
1869. I also use this data, along with data on the unemployment rate from Carter (2006) and 
the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS), to test the Gordon, Weisskopf and Bowles (1983) 
hypothesis regarding the difference between reproductive and non-reproductive cycles. My 
analysis of US data between 1869 and 2010 shows two things: (a) increases in the reserve army 
of labour are associated with increases in expected profitability during reproductive cycles, and 
(b) increases in the reserve army of labour are associated with reduction in expected 
profitability during non-reproductive cycles. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis in 
Gordon, Weisskopf and Bowles (1983).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I investigate the presence of 
long waves for a sample of 20 advanced capitalist countries since 1848. In section 3, I discuss 
the SSA approach to long waves, outline the Gordon, Weisskopf and Bowles (1983) hypothesis 
and present results of an econometric test of that hypothesis. In section 4, I conclude the 
discussion, highlight some caveats and suggest some directions for future research. Appendix 1 
contains details of the data sources and definitions of key variables used for the analysis in the 
paper. 
7 
 
2. Evidence of Long Waves in Capitalist Countries 
In this section, I present evidence for the existence of long waves of economic activity in 20 
capitalist economies since 1848. I measure the pace of economic activity by two measures: (a) 
the annual rate of growth of real gross domestic product (GDP); and (b) the annual rate of 
growth of real per capita GDP.1 I use data on real GDP and per capita real GDP (both measured 
in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars) for 20 capitalist countries (in Europe and the New World). The 
real GDP series comes from Angus Maddison’s original data and is relatively complete from 
1870 to 2008. The data on real per capital real GDP series comes from the Maddison Project 
initiated by a group of scholars to update Angus Maddison’s original data. These data are 
relatively complete between 1848 and 2010.2  
To identify the turning points of long waves before 1980, I draw on qualitative evidence 
from the historical literature summarized in Mandel (1978; 1995); for turning points after 1980, 
I draw on qualitative evidence presented in Kotz (2009). Together, this literature highlights the 
following 4 long waves since the middle of the 19th century:  
• Long Wave 1 (1848-1893): composed of the upswing during 1848-1873, and the 
downswing from 1874 to 1893; 
• Long Wave 2 (1894-1948[40]): composed of the upswing from 1894 to 1913, and the 
downswing from 1914 to 1948 (1940 in non-European countries); 
• Long Wave 3 (1949[41]-1982: composed of the upswing from 1949(41) to 1967, and 
the downswing from 1968 to 1982; 
                                                          
1 In Gordon, Edwards and Reich (1982), one of the measures used to track long waves is the growth rate of real 
gross national product (GNP). 
2 More details of the data set are available in the Appendix. 
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• Long Wave 4 (1983-?): composed of the upswing from 1983 to 2007, and the 
downswing since 2008. 
In Table 1, I present estimates of the average of annual growth rates of per capita real 
GDP for 20 capitalist countries for the upswing and downswing phases of the 4 long waves 
identified above. The evidence in Table 1 shows that, in general, the average growth rate of per 
capita real GDP is higher in the upswing than in the downswing phase of all the 4 long waves. 
But there are some differences over the long waves too: in the first long wave, 7 out of 20 
countries in my sample display lower average growth of per capita real GDP in the upswing than 
in the downswing phase; in the second and third long waves, 3 and 2 countries, respectively, 
display this pattern; and in the last long wave, no country has this pattern. Thus, out of a total 
of 77 country-periods, there are only 12 anomalous cases (when the average growth rate of per 
capita real GDP is lower in the upswing, than in the downswing, phase of the long wave).3 In 
Figure 1, I present the difference in average growth rates of per capita real GDP for long wave 
downswings and upswings visually using bar charts.  
[Table 1 about here] 
[Figure 1 about here] 
In Table 2, I report results of testing for the equality of mean growth rates of per capita 
real GDP between upswing and downswing phases of long waves. I conduct this test for five 
                                                          
3 Data is missing for Ireland for the first long wave and the upswing phase of the second long wave. That is why 
there are 77 country-periods, instead of 80. 
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different time periods: 1848-2010, 1860-2010, 1890-2010, 1945-2010, and 1983-2010.4 The 
results in the table show that there was a statistically significant difference in the annual 
growth rate of real per capital GDP between long wave upswings and long wave downswings 
for all the sample periods other than 1945-2010. Since the difference in the growth rates 
between upswings and downswings is significant for the period, 1983-2010, this implies that 
the difference was insignificant in the so-called Golden Age, the period from the end of World 
War II to the beginning of the 1980s. By this analysis, the so-called Golden Age emerges as an 
anomalous period to the persistent patterns observed for the history of capitalism since the 
mid-nineteenth century. 
[Table 2 about here] 
In Table 3 and 4, I complement the evidence in Table 1 and 2, with results from some 
simple regressions of the following form:  
𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽 × 𝑈𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (1) 
where 𝑖 indexes countries, 𝑡 indexes years, 𝑔𝑖𝑡 represents the annual growth rate of real per 
capita GDP, 𝑈𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡 represents an upswing dummy variable that takes the value 1 for years when 
the country is in the upswing phase of a long wave (as identified by dates in Table 1) and 0 
otherwise, and 𝜇𝑖 represents a country fixed effect.  
                                                          
4 Some countries in the Madison data set have per capita real GDP data only from 1860. Hence, we get a strongly 
balanced panel for the period 1860-2010. So, I conduct the test for this period to make sure that results do not 
change from the relatively unbalanced panel for 1848-2010. I run a separate test for the period 1890-2010 because 
capitalist development, and especially industrialization, was relatively incomplete in many countries prior to 1890. 
If the long wave emerges with the dominance of capitalist relations of production, the period since 1890 could be 
seen as the proper period for studying the phenomenon of long waves. 
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The key parameter in regression in (1) is 𝛽, which gives us the average difference in the 
growth rate in per capita real GDP between upswing and downswing phases of long waves. 
When (1) is estimated as a pooled OLS regression, 𝜇𝑖 = 𝜇, so that all the countries have the 
same intercept; but, when (1) is estimated with the within (fixed effect or FE) estimator, each 
country has a separate intercept. My preferred estimator is the latter, which estimates the 
average difference in the growth rates between upswing and downswing phases of long waves 
after allowing for differences in the average growth rate across countries due to country-
specific unobserved factors. 
[Table 3 about here] 
In Table 3, I report results for the five different time periods that were used in Table 2: 
1848-2010 (specification 1), 1860-2010 (specification 2), 1890-2010 (specification 3), 1945-2010 
(specification 4), and 1983-2010 (specification 5). For both the pooled OLS and the FE 
estimators, average growth rates in the upswing phase of long waves is significantly higher than 
the corresponding average in downswing phases of long waves. The difference was about 1 
percentage points in specifications 1 through 3, and increased to more than 3 percentage 
points in specification 5. For instance, over the period, 1890-2010, average growth rates in the 
upswing phase of long waves was about 1.17% higher than in the long downswing phase of long 
waves (using a FE estimator). The significance of the difference is true for all specifications 
other than specification 4, i.e., for the whole postwar sample years (where the coefficient 
estimate is about half at about 0.5 and no longer statistically significantly different from zero). 
Since the difference is significant for specification 5, with sample years 1983-2010, this 
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highlights the anomalous behavior of the so-called Golden Age (when the difference between 
the upswing and downswing phases was negligible).  
In Table 4, I report results analogous to Table 3 but with the growth rate of real GDP as 
the dependent variable (instead of the growth rate of real per capita GDP). Since relatively 
complete data on real GDP starts only in 1870, I report results for four time periods: 1874-2008 
(specification 1); 1890-2008 (specification 2); 1945-2008 (specification 3); and 1983-2008 
(specification 4). The results in Table 4 are similar to those in Table 3. The growth rate of real 
GDP differs by about 1 percentage points for specifications 1 and 2, and the difference is 
statistically significant at standard levels of significance. When we come to the postwar period, 
1945-2008, the corresponding difference is much smaller (about 0.1) and it is no longer 
statistically significant. But when we move to the period since the early 1980s, we see the 
difference emerge as significant once again. This reiterates the anomalous nature of the 
immediate postwar period (1945-1983).  
[Table 4 about here] 
The evidence in Table 1 through 4 together suggests that there are long waves of 
economic activity in the 20 capitalist countries in our sample. The average rate of growth of per 
capita real GDP is statistically significantly higher for upswing phases of long waves compared 
to the downswing phases of the long waves for longer historical time periods, 1848-2010, 1860-
2010 and 1890-2010, and also for the shorter period since the early 1980s, 1983-2010. The only 
exception to this pattern is the so-called Golden Age (the two and a half decades after the end 
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of World War II). The causes of this anomalous behavior of the immediate postwar period call 
for further investigation.   
3. Expected Profitability and Long Waves in the US 
The analysis and discussion in the previous section takes the dates of the turning points of long 
waves as given – using qualitative evidence gleaned from the historical literature – and 
investigates whether there is any systematic difference in the pace of economic activity 
between the long downswing and upswing phases. Gordon, Weisskopf and Bowles (1983) offer 
an alternative – more theoretically grounded – method for identifying long waves by linking it 
to discussions of social structures of accumulation and expected profitability. 
3.1 Identifying Long Waves 
A social structure of accumulation (SSA) is the set of political and economic institutions that 
directly impinge on the capital accumulation process – the activity of generating and 
reinvesting surplus value in capitalist firms – by anchoring expected profitability. These range 
from institutions that affect all stages of the capital accumulation process like monetary and 
financial institution, the involvement of the State in the economy and the state of the class 
struggle, to institutions that have significance for specific stages of the capital accumulation 
process like those that affect input supplies and the structure of aggregate demand and the 
labour process. The concept of the SSA is useful because it can help us identify long waves of 
capitalist development (or what Gordon (1980) called ‘stages of accumulation’), each long wave 
being differentiated by a definite and different matrix of political-economic institutions – the 
specific SSA.  
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Once a new SSA is in place, it generates stable and buoyant expectations about 
profitability. This spurs capital accumulation, and leads to rapid economic growth, typically 
spanning several business cycles. Over time, the growth process brings to the fore hidden 
contradictions of the SSA. Gradually, these growing conflicts and contradictions erode 
profitability expectations and reduce the pace of capital accumulation and economic growth, 
ushering in a period of a long downswing. The economy can remain in the downswing phase of 
the long wave for several business cycles, and the next upswing phase of a new long wave only 
begins with the construction of a new SSA that can revive profitability expectations in a robust 
manner (Gordon, Edwards and Reich, 1982).   
Since expected profitability is the key driver of the process of capital accumulation and 
economic growth, Gordon, Weisskopf and Bowles (1983) argued that changes in expected 
profitability over business cycle downturns can be used to identify upswing and downswing 
phases of long waves. They posited that business cycle downturns in the upswing phase of a 
long wave are “reproductive” cycles in the sense that endogenous mechanisms associated with 
the cyclical downturn revive expected profitability. On the other hand, cyclical downturns in the 
downswing phase no longer serve this function and become “nonreproductive” in the sense 
that the cyclical downturn does not by itself revive expected profitability. It is only the 
construction of a new SSA that can revive expected profitability, spur capital accumulation and 
take the economy out of the downswing phase of the long wave. Thus, Gordon, Weisskopf and 
Bowles (1983) offer a simple definition to differentiate upswing and downswing phases of long 
waves, which is summarized as  
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Definition 1: If expected profitability increases over a business cycle downturn, then that 
business cycle is part of the upswing phase of a long wave; otherwise it is part of the downswing 
phase of the long wave. 
I will operationalize this definition and use it on historical data for the US economy from 
Duménil and Lévy (2013). But to do so I need to distinguish between actual, full-capacity and 
expected profit rate. 
3.2 Actual, Full-Capacity and Expected Profit Rate 
Let us denote the actual, full-capacity and expected profit rates as 𝑟𝑎, 𝑟𝑓𝑐, and 𝑟𝑒, respectively. 
For any period, 𝑡, the actual profit rate is defined in a straightforward manner as the ratio of the 
actual profit flows over the period and the capital stock at the beginning of the period, 
𝑟𝑎(𝑡) = Πa(𝑡)𝐾(𝑡)       (2) 
where Π𝑎 denote actual profit flows over 𝑡, and 𝐾(𝑡) denotes the capital stock at the beginning 
of period 𝑡. Following Weisskopf (1979), I decompose the actual rate of profit into three 
components as 
𝑟𝑎(𝑡) = 𝑠π(𝑡) × 𝑧(𝑡) × 𝑢(𝑡)     (3) 
where 𝑠𝜋(t) = Πa(t)/Y(t) is the share of (actual) profit in output, 𝑧(𝑡) = 𝑌∗(𝑡)/𝐾(𝑡) is ratio of 
full-capacity output and the replacement cost capital stock, and 𝑢(𝑡) = 𝑌(𝑡)/𝑌∗(𝑡)is the 
capacity utilization rate. 
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For any period 𝑡, I define the full-capacity profit rate as the ratio of full-capacity profit 
flows over the period and the capital stock at the beginning of the period: 
𝑟𝑓𝑐(𝑡) = Πfc(𝑡)𝐾(𝑡)      (4) 
The full-capacity profit flows and actual profit flows over any period is, in turn, related 
as follows: 
Π𝑓𝑐(𝑡) = Πa(𝑡)𝑢(𝑡)      (5) 
where 𝑢(𝑡) is the capacity utilization rate in period 𝑡. Thus, if in period 𝑡, the economy happens 
to be operating at full-capacity (so that 𝑢(𝑡) = 1), then the full-capacity profit flow is equal to 
the actual profit flow over that period. On the other hand, if the economy is operating below 
full-capacity (so that 𝑢(𝑡) < 1), then the full-capacity profit flow is higher than the actual profit 
flow.5  
Since the full-capacity profit rate is given by 
𝑟𝑓𝑐(𝑡) ≡ Πfc(𝑡)𝐾(𝑡) = Πa(t)/u(t)𝐾(𝑡) = Πa(t)𝐾(𝑡) × 1𝑢(𝑡)     (6) 
we can decompose it as: 
                                                          
5 Note that “full-capacity profit flow” is, in effect, a hypothetical quantity for periods when the economy is not 
operating at full-capacity. In such situations, the full-capacity profit income is the answer to the following 
counterfactual question: what would the profit flow be if the economy were to operate at full capacity? Equation 
(5) provides an answer to that question and defines the full-capacity profit flow. In general, it seems reasonable to 
suggest that full-capacity profit income is a function of actual profit income and the capacity utilization rate. 
Equation (5) assumes a particular functional form for this function, whereby the full capacity profit income is 
defined as the ratio of actual profit income and the capacity utilization rate. This implies that the ratio of full 
capacity and actual profit income is a nonlinear and decreasing function of the capacity utilization rate, 1/𝑢.  
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𝑟𝑓𝑐(𝑡) = Πa(t)𝐾(𝑡) × 1𝑢(𝑡) = 𝑠π(𝑡)×𝑧(𝑡)×𝑢(𝑡)𝑢(𝑡) = 𝑠𝜋(𝑡) × 𝑧(𝑡) (7) 
Following Gordon, Weisskopf and Bowles (1983), I will define the expected profit rate as 
the product of the full-capacity profit rate and expected capacity utilization, i.e., 
𝑟𝑒(𝑡) = 𝑟𝑓𝑐(𝑡) × 𝑢𝑒(𝑡)     (8) 
where 𝑢𝑒(𝑡) is the expected capacity utilization rate. In (8), the first factor captures the profit 
rate that would arise if firms had the ability to adjust their capacity utilization to their “desired” 
levels; the second factor captures the fluctuations in expected profitability driven by changes in 
expected capacity utilization (as indicators of fluctuations of aggregate demand).  
Equation (8) can be written in terms of growth rates as 
𝑟𝑒�(𝑡) = 𝑟𝑓𝑐� (𝑡) + 𝑢𝑒�(𝑡)    (9) 
where the “hat” symbol denotes growth rate, i.e., 𝑥�(𝑡) = (1/𝑥(𝑡))𝑑𝑥(𝑡)/𝑑𝑡.  
As Gordon, Weisskopf and Bowles (1983) correctly notes, a business cycle downturn is 
unlikely to have a positive effect on the expected utilization rate. Thus, we can posit that  
𝑢𝑒�(𝑡) ≤ 0. Hence, 
𝑟𝑒�(𝑡) ≤ 𝑟𝑓𝑐� (𝑡) = 𝑠𝜋� (𝑡) + ?̂?(𝑡)   (10) 
where the equality in the second half of (10) comes from using (7).  
The logic of (10) is important for the subsequent analysis and worth highlighting: since 
expected capacity utilization is unlikely to increase over a business cycle downturn, (10) 
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suggests that a cyclical downturn can increase the expected rate of profit only when the full-
capacity profit rate increases. Hence, we can operationalize the insight of Gordon, Weisskopf 
and Bowles (1983) regarding the identification of long wave upswings/downswings using 
changes in the full-capacity profit rate.  
It is useful to note that (10) also shows that the full-capacity profit rate can increase in 
either of the following ways: (a) the full-capacity profit share increases; or (b) the full-capacity 
output-capital ratio increases; or (c) both the profit share and the full capacity output-capital 
ratio increases. On the one hand, the full-capacity profit share can increase by weakening the 
bargaining power of labour vis-à-vis capital, as the reserve army of labour is replenished during 
a cyclical downturn.6 On the other hand, the full-capacity output-capital ratio can increase 
because high-cost firms are eliminated during a downturn or high-cost processes are not used 
within surviving firms (Gordon, Weisskopf and Bowles, 1983). 
3.3 Long Waves in the US Economy 
Table 5 presents data on changes in the full-capacity rate of profit (as defined in equation 7) for 
the 28 cyclical downturns in the US economy since 1869.7 The criterion in definition 1 is used to 
classify each downturn, in the last column in Table 5, as either a reproductive cycle (RC=1) or a 
                                                          
6 A more nuanced story can be developed when we decompose the profit share as 1 – real unit labour cost, where 
the real unit labour cost is the ratio of the real wage rate and the product of output per unit of effort and effort per 
hour (see Gordon, Weisskopf and Bowles, 1983, for details).  
7 Following Gordon, Weisskopf and Bowles (1983), I will define a business cycle downturn as the period from the 
peak of a business cycle to one year after the trough. The addition of a year after the trough is meant to allow time 
for a possible reproductive cycle to do its work in reviving expected profitability. Business cycle dates have been 
taken from the website of the NBER: http://www.nber.org/cycles.html  
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non-reproductive cycle (RC=0).8 A succession of reproductive (non-reproductive) business 
cycles makes up the upswing (downswing) phase of long wave.  
Using this classification scheme, the US economy has witnessed 7 long waves since 
1867. The first long wave ran from 1867 to 1888, with an upswing phase from 1867 to 1880, 
and a downswing phase from 1880 to 1888.9 Next, there was a long wave from 1890 to 1908. 
This was followed by 5 long waves, the latest spanning the period since 1980. Figure 1 displays 
bar charts of changes in expected profitability and its two components over the 28 cyclical 
downturns that obtained over these 7 long waves.  
[Table 5 about here] 
The evidence presented in Table 5 and Figure 1 highlights a pattern of long waves in full-
capacity profitability in the US economy. Visual inspection of the three series in Figure 1 
confirms that changes in full-capacity profitability and its two components over cyclical 
downturns display some persistence, so that positive changes are followed by positive changes 
and negative changes by negative changes. This bunching together of reproductive and non-
reproductive cycles – the sequence of 0s and 1s in the last column of Table5– attests to a wave-
like nature of profitability that is consistent with the existence of long waves.     
[Figure 2 about here] 
                                                          
8 In their empirical analysis, Gordon, Weisskopf and Bowles (1983) ignore the output-capital ratio because of lack 
of reliable historical data on capital stock. Thus, they effectively reduce profitability to the profit share, which is a 
possible limitation of their results. Since capital stock data is now available, we can address this limitation by 
analyzing expected profitability (and both of its components).  
9 According to NBER data, the business cycle which peaked in 1869 had its beginning in 1867. 
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3.4 The GWB Hypothesis  
After developing the innovative method for identification of long waves using reproductive and 
non-reproductive business cycle downturns, Gordon, Weisskopf and Bowles (1983) offer a 
hypothesis about a possible mechanism the operation of which could distinguish reproductive 
and non-reproductive business cycle downturns. This relates to the restorative effect of 
changes in the reserve army of labour on profitability. 
Since reproductive cycles are part of the upswing phase of long waves, they expect a 
positive relationship between peak-to-trough (with trough defined as NBER trough plus one 
year) changes in the unemployment rate (as a measure of the increase in the size of the reserve 
army of labour) and full-capacity profitability, especially the full-capacity profit share, for 
reproductive cycles. Thus, increases in the size of the reserve army of labour are sufficient, in 
reproductive cycles, to depress the power of labour and restore full-capacity (and expected) 
profitability. On the other hand, no such association is expected between changes in the 
unemployment rate and expected profitability for non-reproductive cycles. Thus, changes in 
reserve army of labour are not able to restore profitability during non-reproductive cycles. I call 
this the Gordon-Weisskopf-Bowles (GWB) hypothesis and test it econometrically.  
3.4.1 The Econometric Model 
To test the Gordon-Weisskopf-Bowles (GWB) hypothesis I use the following regression model: 
𝑔𝑡𝐹𝐶𝑃 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑔𝑡𝑈𝑁 +  𝛽2(𝐵𝐶𝐷𝑡 × 𝑔𝑡𝑈𝑁) + 𝛽3(𝑅𝐶𝑡 × 𝐵𝐶𝐷𝑡 × 𝑔𝑡𝑈𝑁) + 𝛽4𝑅𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝐶𝐷𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 
      (11) 
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where 𝑡 indexes years, 𝑔𝑡𝐹𝐶𝑃denotes annual growth rate of full-capacity profitability (or its two 
components), 𝐵𝐶𝐷𝑡 denotes a business cycle downturn dummy variable (which takes the value 
1 for years that fall in the period between a business cycle peak and one year after the trough,  
other than the case when that coincides with the next peak, and 0 for other years), 𝑅𝐶𝑡 
denotes a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the year fall within a business cycle 
downturn that is a reproductive cycle (and 0 otherwise), and 𝑔𝑡𝑈𝑁 is the annual growth rate of 
the unemployment rate.  
 While testing for the effect of changes in the reserve army of labour on the growth rate 
of expected profitability, the regression model in (11) controls for two important sources of 
variation that could confound the result. First, inclusion of the reproductive cycle dummy (𝑅𝐶𝑡) 
and the business cycle downturn dummy (𝐵𝐶𝐷𝑡) controls for factors that vary over the upswing 
phase of long wavess and over business cycle downturns, respectively, and might be correlated 
with changes in the reserve army of labour and expected profitability, like the behavior of 
financial markets, behavior of the Central Bank, etc. Second, we also include a set of dummy 
variables defined over the long waves – one dummy variable for each of the seven long swing 
since 1890. This is meant to control for factors that change only across long waves, like 
institutional factors relating to the regulation of financial markets, capital-labour relations, and 
the role of the State in the economy.  
Even after these controls, there remains an obvious problem: the possibility of 
endogeneity. While increases in the size of the reserve army of labour over business cycle 
downturns – captured by the growth rate of unemployment rate – is expected to have an 
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impact on expected profitability, as suggested by the GWB hypothesis, it is difficult to rule out 
the reverse causal effect. It is equally possible for changes in expected profitability to have an 
effect on the size of the reserve army of labour through the impact of the former on the rate of 
capital accumulation: if expected profitability falls, it might lead to a fall in the pace of capital 
accumulation, which would lead to an increase in the size of the reserve army of labour 
because of a decline in the demand for labour-power. To block off this obvious channel of 
reverse causality, I include the growth rate of real investment as an additional control in the 
regression model in (11). Thus, I estimate the following model to test the GWB hypothesis: 
𝑔𝑡𝐹𝐶𝑃 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑔𝑡𝑈𝑁 +  𝛽2(𝐵𝐶𝐷𝑡 × 𝑔𝑡𝑈𝑁) + 𝛽3(𝑅𝐶𝑡 × 𝐵𝐶𝐷𝑡 × 𝑔𝑡𝑈𝑁) + 𝛽4𝑅𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝐶𝐷𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑔𝑡𝐼𝑁𝑉 + 𝑢𝑡         (12) 
where 𝑔𝑡𝐼𝑁𝑉 is the growth rate of real investment, and all other variables are as defined in (11). 
The GWB hypothesis entails two propositions about the parameters in the regression model 
in (12):  
(a) 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 ≤ 0, and (b) 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 > 0.   (13) 
To see the first part, note that the partial effect of the growth rate of the unemployment rate 
on the growth rate of full-capacity profitability over a business cycle downturn (𝐵𝐶𝐷𝑡 = 1) 
when the economy is in a non-reproductive cycle (𝑅𝐶𝑡 = 0) is given by 
𝜕
𝜕𝑔𝑡𝑈𝑁
𝐸(𝑔𝑡𝐹𝐶𝑃|𝐵𝐶𝐷𝑡 = 1,𝑅𝐶𝑡 = 0) = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 
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where 𝐸(𝑦|𝑥) refers to the conditional expectation of 𝑦 given 𝑥. Since a non-reproductive cycle 
does not restore profitability, the GWB hypothesis implies that this partial effect must be non-
positive, i.e., 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 ≤ 0.  
To see the second part, note, in an analogous manner, that the partial effect of the 
growth rate of the unemployment rate on the growth rate of full-capacity profitability over a 
business cycle downturn (𝐵𝐶𝐷𝑡 = 1) when the economy is in a non-reproductive cycle 
(𝑅𝐶𝑡 = 1) is given by 
𝜕
𝜕𝑔𝑡𝑈𝑁
𝐸(𝑔𝑡𝐹𝐶𝑃|𝐵𝐶𝐷𝑡 = 1,𝑅𝐶𝑡 = 1) = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3. 
Since a reproductive cycle is meant to revive full-capacity profitability, the GWB hypothesis 
implies that this partial effect must be positive, i.e., 𝛽1 + β2 + 𝛽3 > 0. 
3.4.2 The Results 
To begin the discussion of results, I show time series plots of the key variables used in this 
analysis in Figure 3: growth rates of unemployment, full-capacity rate of profit, profit share, and 
capacity-capital ratio. The data for this analysis covers the years from 1890 to 2010. I could not 
use the years before 1890 for the regression analysis because the unemployment series starts 
in 1890, i.e., I did not have data for the years 1869-1890.  
[Figure 3 about here] 
There are two important features that are worth noting. First, the growth rate of 
unemployment and the growth rate of the capacity-capital ratio display higher volatility in pre-
war period than in the subsequent years. Second, there is a period in the early 1930s – the 
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years 1932 to 1934 – that is an outlier in terms of the growth rates of the profit share and 
expected profit rate. To take account of the first feature, I use heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors; to make sure that the results are robust to the 
second feature, I re-do the analysis by including a dummy variable for the outlier years, and 
also do a sub-sample analysis by dropping the outlier years.  
In Table 6, I report results of estimating three variants of the regression model in (12). In 
columns 1 through 3, I report results for the regression model with full-capacity profit share, 
full-capacity output-capital ratio, and the full-capacity profit rate, respectively, as the 
dependent variable. Our interest is in testing the two parts of the GWB hypothesis and not in 
the values and significance of individual parameter estimates. Thus, even though I report the 
individual parameter estimates in Table 6 for completeness, I will restrict my comments to the 
results of the hypothesis tests that are reported in Table 7.  
[Table 6 about here] 
Panel A in Table 7 reports results of hypothesis tests for the model in (12) for the full 
sample period, 1890-2010. The first part of the GWB hypothesis is that 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 ≤ 0, i.e., that 
the impact of changes in the unemployment rate on full-capacity profitability over business 
cycle downturns is non-positive for non-reproductive cycles. The top part presents results of 
testing the null hypothesis that 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 = 0 against the alternative that 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 ≠ 0. The sum 
of the two coefficients is negative and statistically significant for specifications 1 (-0.218) and 3 
(-203). Thus, if we use either the profit share or the full-capacity profit rate as the dependent 
variable in (12), the first part of the GWB hypothesis is supported by the data, i.e., that the 
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impact of changes in the unemployment rate on profitability over business cycle downturns is 
non-positive for non-reproductive cycles. For instance, the results suggest that for each 
percentage point increase in the growth rate of the unemployment rate, the growth rate of full-
capacity profit rate falls by 0.203 percentage points per year over business cycle downturns in 
non-reproductive cycles. 
[Table 7 about here] 
The second part of the GWB hypothesis is that  𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 > 0, i.e., that the impact 
of changes in the unemployment rate on full-capacity profitability over business cycle 
downturns is positive for reproductive cycles. The bottom part of Panel A presents results of 
testing the null hypothesis that 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 = 0 against the alternative that 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 ≠ 0. 
The first thing to note is that the sum of the coefficients is positive for all specifications, but it is 
statistically significantly different from zero only for specification 2, i.e. when we use the 
capacity-capital ratio as the dependent variable. This suggests that the internal mechanism of a 
business cycle downturn, as captured by increases in the growth rate of the unemployment 
rate, manages to increase the growth rate of the profit share, the capacity-capital ratio and the 
full-capacity profit rate over reproductive cycles. But this effect is precisely estimated only for 
the full capacity-capital ratio (p-value = 0.002); for the profit share and the full capacity profit 
rate, the effect, while positive, is not very precisely estimated (both have large p-values). 
The last part of panel A of Table 7 reports results of jointly testing both parts of the 
GWB hypothesis. To do so we test the joint null hypothesis 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 = 0 and 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 = 0, 
against the alternative that 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 ≠ 0 and 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 ≠ 0. From the last row of panel A in 
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Table 7 we see that we can reject the null hypothesis against the alternative for specification 2. 
Taken together, the results in Table 7 provide evidence in support of the GWB hypothesis, 
either separately or jointly. 
 In Panels B and C in Table 7, I report results to make sure that the results are not 
impacted by the presence of outlier years (1932-1934). In Panel B, I control for the effect of 
outliers by including a dummy variable that take a value of 1 for the years 1932-1934 and 0 
otherwise. In Panel C, I re-do the analysis by dropping the outlier years. Both sets of results are 
similar to the results of Panel A. This suggests that the presence of outlier years do not have an 
oversize impact on the main results. 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
The hypothesis of long waves of capitalist development that span several business cycles has 
been of some interest to Marxist political economists since the late 19th century (see Mandel, 
1978; 1995). In this paper, I contribute to this literature in two ways.  
First, I have used data for a group of 20 (now advanced) capitalist countries to 
investigate if there is a systematic difference in the growth rate of real per capita GDP (and real 
GDP) between the upswing and downswing phases of long waves. Using turning points of long 
waves from the historical literature summarized in Mandel (1995), I find evidence for the 
existence of long waves: there is a systematic difference in the average growth rate of per 
capita real GDP (and real GDP) between the upswing and downswing phases of long waves for 
the group of capitalist countries in my sample. In addition to this positive result, I also find the 
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puzzling result that this difference was small and might have disappeared altogether in the 
immediate post-war period. But the difference has re-emerged once again in the data for the 
period after the 1980s. Thus, while the anomalous behavior of the immediate postwar period 
calls for further investigation, it is safe to conclude that the historical evidence lends support to 
the hypothesis of long waves of capitalist development. 
Second, I revisit the analysis in Gordon, Weisskopf and Bowles (1983) which proposes a 
method of identifying and offer a mechanism underlying long waves. Their method rests on 
identifying a business cycle downturn – the period from a business cycle peak to a year after 
the trough – as a reproductive cycle if expected profitability increased over that period. A 
cyclical downturn that does not lead to an increase in expected profitability is classified as a 
non-reproductive cycle. Long waves are identified by breaks in the sequence of reproductive 
and non-reproductive cycles. 
Using their method on historical data for the US economy compiled by Duménil and 
Lévy (2013) and business cycle dates computed by the National Bureau of Economic Research, I 
identify 7 long waves in the US economy since 1869. These are composed of 19 reproductive 
and 10 non-reproductive cycles. Visual inspection suggests an alternating and persistent 
pattern in the sequence of reproductive and non-reproductive cycles, i.e., bunching together of 
reproductive and non-reproductive cycles (see Table 5 and Figure 1). 
Using this historical data for the US economy since 1890, I also test a two-part 
hypothesis advanced by Gordon, Weisskopf and Bowles (1983) regarding the mechanism 
underlying non-reproductive cycles: (a) that changes in the unemployment rate should be 
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positively associated with changes in expected profitability over business cycle downturns in 
reproductive cycles, and (b) that there should be no such positive association between change 
in the unemployment rate and profitability over business cycle downturns in non-reproductive 
cycles. I find evidence that increases in the growth rate of unemployment over business cycle 
downturns increases the full capacity-capital ratio (a key component of expected profitability) 
during the upswing phase of long waves. On the other hand, increases in the unemployment 
rate over business cycle downturns reduce the profit share (a component of expected 
profitability) and the expected rate of profit during long wave downturns.  
Empirical evidence for the existence of long waves, using turning points either from the 
historical literature (Mandel, 1995) or using a more theoretically-grounded method of 
distinguishing reproductive and non-reproductive cycles (Gordon, Weisskopf and Bowles, 
1983), suggest that the phenomenon of long waves does exist in the historical data. While the 
evidence on the existence of long waves is certainly there, the theory to explain them calls for 
more research.  
An interesting possible mechanism suggested by Gordon, Weisskopf and Bowles (1983) 
that operates through changes in the size of the reserve army of labour seems important during 
non-reproductive cycles but less so over reproductive cycles. The fact that the change in the 
reserve army of labour is associated with negative changes in full-capacity profitability might be 
pointing towards the importance of the effect of aggregate demand, a point that has typically 
not been emphasized in this literature. While increases in the reserve army of labour has a 
positive impact on expected profitability because it reduces cost pressures for capitalist firms 
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(by reducing the real unit labour cost), it might also have a negative impact because it reduces 
aggregate demand. It might be the case that the second effect dominates the first during non-
reproductive cycles, but only balances out the second during reproductive cycles. This is a 
hypothesis worth exploring in future research. 
I would like to end with some caveats about and possible extensions of the analysis in 
this paper. First, to test for the presence of long waves, I have used only two measures: (a) 
growth rate of per capita real GDP, and (b) growth rate of real GDP. One natural extension 
would be to see if we find similar results using other measures like volume of exports, relative 
length of business cycle upswings versus downswings, rate of inflation, long term interest rates. 
Second, the identification of long waves that we get from using the historical literature is 
different from the one we get using the methodology of Gordon, Weisskopf and Bowles (1983). 
Hence, a question that will require some attention is how to reconcile the long wave 
periodization from these two methods.  
Third, the econometric analysis of the GWB hypothesis can be extended in several 
directions. To build the econometric model, I have defined the full capacity profit rate (in 
section 3.2) as the ratio of the actual profit rate and the capacity utilization rate. This is only 
one way to relate the full capacity profit income to the actual profit income and the capacity 
utilization. One could explore alternative relationships between these three variables. 
Moreover, the analysis used time series data for the US economy. So, a natural extension would 
be use a panel data set of many capitalist countries, which would also allow the researcher to 
control for possible unobserved country-level confounding factors.    
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Appendix 1: Data Sources 
In this appendix, I provide details of the data sources used for the analyses in this paper. 
1. For the analysis of long waves for a group of 20 capitalist countries, I use data from The 
Maddison-Project (2013) for the period 1848-2010. The Maddison-Project builds on the 
pioneering work of Angus Maddison and makes available consistent historical data for a 
large group of countries going back all the way to 1AD. I use the following variables:  
a. real GDP (measured in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars). 
b. per capita real GDP (measured in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars). 
2. For the analysis of expected profitability and long waves in the US economy, I use data 
from Duménil and Lévy (2013), Carter (2006), and the website of the Bureau of Labour 
Statistics (BLS). Below, I provide definitions of variables and their sources: 
a. Profit Share: This is defined as 1 minus the ratio of the wage bill and the nominal 
net domestic product. The wage bill is defined as the product of the hourly wage 
and the total hours worked. All data series are from Duménil and Lévy (2013). 
b. Output-Capital Ratio: This is defined as the ratio of the nominal net domestic 
product and the replacement cost capital stock. Both data series are from 
Duménil and Lévy (2013). 
c. Capacity Utilization Rate: To compute the capacity utilization rate, I first 
calculate the ratio of real net domestic product and its trend, where the trend is 
computed by fitting a Hodrick-Prescott filter and the data series is from Duménil 
and Lévy (2013), and call this 𝑐𝑡. I define capacity utilization rate (𝑢𝑡) as follows: 
𝑢𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 − (max𝑡 𝑐𝑡 − 1). The adjustment factor max𝑡 𝑐𝑡 − 1 ensures that the 
capacity utilization rate 𝑢𝑡 always lies below 1.  
d. Full-Capacity Output-Capital Ratio: This is defined as the ratio of the output-
capital ratio and the capacity utilization rate. 
e. Full-Capacity Rate of Profit: This is defined as the product of profit share and the 
full-capacity output-capital ratio. 
f. Unemployment Rate: This series is taken from two sources. For the period 1890-
1947, the data series is Ba476 and is taken from Carter (2006). For the 
subsequent years, data is taken from the website of the Bureau of Labour 
Statistics (series id is UNRATE). In both sources, the unemployment rate is 
measured in the standard manner as the ratio of the unemployed persons and 
the total civilian labour force (employed + unemployed). 
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Table 1: Average Annual Growth Rate of Per Capita Real GDP, 1848-2010 
 
Long Wave 1 Long Wave 2 Long Wave 3 Long Wave 4 
 
Upswing Downswing Upswing Downswing Upswing Downswing Upswing Downswing 
 
1848-
1873 1874-1893 
1894-
1913 1914-1948 
1949-
1967 1968-1982 
1983-
2007 2008-2010 
Australia* 2.358 -0.154 1.215 0.662 2.053 1.965 2.189 0.888 
Austria 0.891 1.388 1.489 -0.646 5.784 3.469 2.206 -0.192 
Belgium 1.9 1.016 0.97 0.498 3.11 3.115 1.938 0.0854 
Canada* 2.779 1.183 2.995 0.697 2.683 2.358 1.888 -0.476 
Denmark 0.974 1.227 1.95 1.285 3.28 2.054 1.905 -2.125 
England 0.828 0.622 1.173 0.901 2.098 1.693 2.63 -1.674 
Finland 1.681 0.583 2.382 1.796 3.67 3.525 2.413 -1.893 
France 0.914 1.384 1.595 0.662 4.28 2.824 1.534 -1.106 
Germany 1.463 1.248 1.858 -0.722 6.309 2.677 1.523 0.185 
Greece 1.259 0.131 -0.428 1.211 5.33 3.895 2.312 -2.483 
Ireland 
   
0.901 2.657 3.331 4.265 -5.063 
Italy -0.109 0.859 1.41 0.489 5.564 3.377 1.672 -2.297 
New Zealand* 7.061 -0.0559 1.449 0.745 1.955 1.307 1.575 -0.668 
Netherlands 0.92 0.543 1.092 0.87 3.333 2.157 2.198 -0.617 
Norway 1.94 0.887 1.641 2.123 3.186 3.164 2.537 -0.671 
Portugal 1.93 0.54 0.667 1.407 4.126 4.093 2.278 -0.813 
Spain 1.708 0.311 0.713 0.175 4.696 3.701 2.611 -2.024 
Sweden 1.395 0.981 2.495 2.179 3.154 1.962 2.088 -0.0926 
Switzerland 0.606 3.094 1.843 0.717 2.625 1.415 1.195 0.0107 
USA* 1.283 1.447 1.676 1.035 2.648 1.639 2.186 -1.248 
Notes. (1) Growth rates are calculated using data from the Angus Madison Project (http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-
project/home.htm). (2) * For these countries, the turning point between the downswing phase in long wave 2 and the upswing in long 
wave 3 is 1940. 
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Table 2: Test of Difference in Mean Growth of Per Capita Real GDP in Pooled Samples 
     
 
Mean for Long 
Downswings 
Mean for Long 
Upswings 
Difference in Means 
between Downswings 
and Upswings T-Stat 
     1848-2010 1.19 2.15 -0.96 -4.68*** 
 
(N=1381) (N=1685) 
  
     1860-2010 1.19 2.22 -1.03 -4.98*** 
 
(N=1381) (N=1537) 
  
     1890-2010 1.23 2.38 -1.15 -4.83*** 
 
(N=1077) (N=1311) 
  
     1945-2010 2.25 2.70 -0.44 -1.47 
 
(N=422) (N=896) 
  
     1983-2010 -1.11 2.16 -3.27 -11.93*** 
 
(N=60) (N=500) . . 
          
Notes. This table reports results of testing for the equality of mean growth rate of per capita real GDP for 
pooled samples. The last column reports the t-statistic for the null hypothesis that the difference in the 
mean growth rate of per capita real GDP is the same for long upswings and long downswings. Dates of long 
upswings and downswings are as reported in Table 1. Significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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Table 3: Pooled and Fixed Effect Panel Regression Results using Growth Rate of Real Per Capita GDP, 
1848-2010 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      Panel 1: Pooled Regression 
     UPSWING 0.960*** 1.028*** 1.150*** 0.444 3.271*** 
 
(7.98) (7.98) (8.23) (1.15) (8.05) 
      Panel 2: Country Fixed Effects Regression 
     UPSWING 0.975*** 1.038*** 1.170*** 0.496 3.271*** 
 
(7.92) (7.97) (8.36) (1.30) (8.05) 
      Observations 3066 2918 2388 1320 560 
Countries 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes. This table reports results for a regression of the annual growth rate of per capita real GDP on an 
UPSWING dummy. The UPSWING dummy variable takes the value 1 for years that fall in the upswing phase of 
long waves, and 0 otherwise. The table reports the coefficient on the UPSWING dummy. T-statistics, clustered by 
country, appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Specification (1) use the full sample of years, 
1848-2010; specification (2) use the years, 1860-2010; specification (3) use the years, 1890-2010, specification 
(4) use the years, 1945-2010, and specification (5) uses the years 1983-2010. Dates of long upswings and 
downswings are as reported in Table 1. Significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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Table 4: Pooled and Fixed Effect Panel Regression Results using Growth Rate of Real GDP, 
1874-2008 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     Panel 1: Pooled Regression 
    UPSWING 1.209*** 1.235*** 0.103 1.985*** 
 
(7.39) (6.74) (0.23) (4.83) 
     Panel 2: Country Fixed Effects Regression 
    UPSWING 1.184*** 1.224*** 0.116 1.985*** 
 
(7.26) (6.69) (0.26) (4.83) 
     Observations 2594 2324 1280 520 
Countries 20 20 20 20 
Notes. This table reports results for a regression of the annual growth rate of real GDP on an UPSWING 
dummy. The UPSWING dummy variable takes the value 1 for years that fall in the upswing phase of long 
waves, and 0 otherwise. The table reports the coefficient on the UPSWING dummy. T-statistics, clustered 
by country, appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Specification (1) use the full sample of 
years, 1874-2008; specification (2) use the years, 1890-2008, specification (4) use the years, 1945-2008, 
and specification (5) uses the years, 1983-2008. Dates of long upswings and downswings are as reported in 
Table 1. Significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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Table 5: Profitability in Cyclical Downturns in the US Economy, 1869-2010 
 
  
PEAK TO TROUGH CHANGE (% PER ANNUM) 
Reproductive 
Cycle 
Business 
Cycle 
Peak Trough 
Full-
Capacity 
Profit 
Share 
Full 
Capacity 
Output-
Capital 
Ratio 
Full-
Capacity 
Profitability 
Unemployment 
Rate 
 1 1869 1871 3.53 2.88 0.64 
 
1 
2 1873 1880 4.23 4.19 0.04 
 
1 
3 1882 1886 -15.42 -11.22 -4.73 
 
0 
4 1887 1889 -1.85 -1.02 -0.84 
 
0 
5 1890 1892 1.15 1.08 0.07 4.19 1 
6 1893 1894 4.40 5.24 -0.80 37.08 1 
7 1895 1898 4.81 3.21 1.55 -2.79 1 
8 1899 1901 6.85 4.68 2.08 -15.88 1 
9 1902 1905 10.19 11.37 -1.05 4.08 1 
10 1907 1909 -5.44 -3.36 -2.16 35.66 0 
11 1910 1912 4.49 4.94 -0.43 0.00 1 
12 1913 1915 6.64 6.26 0.36 25.50 1 
13 1918 1919 7.39 -0.62 8.06 88.71 1 
14 1920 1922 -5.05 -2.48 -2.64 28.80 0 
15 1923 1925 6.65 5.74 0.86 4.08 1 
16 1926 1928 -9.16 -6.24 -3.12 27.85 0 
17 1929 1934 -11.96 -8.71 -3.56 41.16 0 
18 1937 1939 7.26 -1.42 8.81 10.80 1 
19 1945 1946 -15.92 -9.09 -7.52 104.66 0 
20 1948 1950 -2.40 0.77 -3.14 16.98 0 
21 1953 1955 0.31 2.42 -2.05 23.18 1 
22 1957 1959 2.73 1.67 1.04 13.10 1 
23 1960 1962 5.59 3.12 2.40 0.90 1 
24 1969 1971 -1.40 0.38 -1.77 30.93 0 
25 1973 1976 -1.84 0.13 -1.96 16.26 0 
26 1980 1983 2.27 0.90 1.35 10.06 1 
27 1990 1992 3.26 0.30 2.95 15.73 1 
28 2001 2002 5.55 4.96 0.56 23.40 1 
29 2007 2010 1.16 1.29 -0.12 27.79 1 
Note: Business cycle dates are from the NBER. Trough = NBER trough year+1 unless it coincides with the next 
peak. Output is measured by nominal net domestic product. Profit share is the ratio of profit income and the 
nominal net domestic product; full capacity output-capital ratio is the ratio of the output-capital ratio and the 
capacity utilization rate; expected profitability is the product of the profit share and the full capacity output-
capital ratio. Unemployment rate is measured by the civilian unemployment rate. A reproductive cycle is a 
cyclical downturn where the expected rate of profit changes by a positive amount. The basic data is from 
Duménil and Lévy (2013). 
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Table 6: Regression Results with Annual Data, 1890-2010 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Profit Share 
Full Capacity 
Output-Capital 
Ratio 
Full-Capacity 
Profitability 
 
   GUNR -0.195* -0.105* -0.300** 
 (0.051) (0.097) (0.028) 
BCD 3.176 -1.267 1.909 
 (0.494) (0.322) (0.699) 
RC 1.500 3.631*** 5.131 
 (0.685) (0.000) (0.178) 
GUNR X BCD -0.023 0.120* 0.098 
 
(0.827) (0.080) (0.494) 
GUNR X BCD X RC 0.270* 0.025 0.295* 
 
(0.058) (0.315) (0.058) 
GINVR 0.411 0.023 0.435 
 
(0.142) (0.698) (0.160) 
Constant -4.530 -1.883** -6.414* 
 
(0.129) (0.045) (0.056) 
F-Stat 2.106 6.244 2.154 
N 121 121 121 
Notes. GUNR = growth rate of the unemployment rate; BCD = business cycle downturn 
dummy variable; RC = reproductive cycle dummy variable; GINVR = growth rate of real 
investment. All specifications include dummy variables for long waves. HAC standard errors 
are in parentheses. Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 7: Results of Hypothesis Tests  
 
Profit Share 
(1) 
Full Capacity Output-
Capital Ratio 
(2) 
Full-Capacity Profitability 
(3) 
Panel A: Basic Model 
 
GUNR + GUNR * BCD = 0 
Sum of Coefficients -0.218 0.015 -0.203 
P-Value 0.037 0.613 0.084 
 
GUNR + GUNR * BCD  + GUNR * BCD  * RC = 0 
Sum of Coefficients 0.052 0.040 0.093 
P-Value 0.370 0.002 0.118 
 
(GUNR + GUNR * BCD = 0) & (GUNR + GUNR * BCD  + GUNR * BCD  * 
RC = 0) 
P-Value 0.110 0.003 0.162 
    Panel B: Using Outlier Dummy as a Control 
 
GUNR + GUNR * BCD = 0 
Sum of Coefficients -0.200 0.015 -0.185 
P-Value 0.022 0.618 0.071 
 
GUNR + GUNR * BCD  + GUNR * BCD  * RC = 0 
Sum of Coefficients 0.051 0.040 0.092 
P-Value 0.379 0.002 0.121 
 
(GUNR + GUNR * BCD = 0) & (GUNR + GUNR * BCD  + GUNR * BCD  * 
RC = 0) 
P-Value 0.071 0.003 0.139 
    Panel C: Excluding Outlier Observation 
 
GUNR + GUNR * BCD = 0 
Sum of Coefficients -0.118 0.020 -0.098 
P-Value 0.003 0.623 0.059 
 
GUNR + GUNR * BCD  + GUNR * BCD  * RC = 0 
Sum of Coefficients 0.004 0.036 0.040 
P-Value 0.909 0.018 0.260 
 
(GUNR + GUNR * BCD = 0) & (GUNR + GUNR * BCD  + GUNR * BCD  * 
RC = 0) 
P-Value 0.012 0.048 0.090 
Notes. This table reports results of hypothesis tests based on the parameter estimates and standard errors given 
in Table 6. For the model that is being estimated, see (12) in the text and for the hypotheses being tested see 
the discussion after (12) in the text. GUNR = growth rate of the unemployment rate; BCD = business cycle 
downturn dummy variable; RC = reproductive cycle dummy variable; GINVR = growth rate of real investment. 
For panels A and B, HAC standard errors are in parentheses. For panel C, we use Davidson-MacKinnon (1993) 
standard errors. Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Figure 1: Mean of the growth rate of per capita real GDP in the upswing (denoted by 0) and downswing 
(denoted by 1) phases of the four long waves of capitalist development since 1848 for a sample of 20 
advanced capitalist countries. For a list of the countries see Table 1.   
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Figure 2: Average Annual Change in Profit Share (top), Full Capacity Output-Capital Ratio (middle) and 
Full-Capacity Profitability (bottom) during cyclical downturns in the US Economy, 1869-2010. 
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Figure 3: Time series plots of the growth rates of the unemployment rate, the profit share, the capacity-
capital ratio and the full-capacity rate of profit. 
 
 
 
 
 
